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IV

I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions.
Most jurisdictions impose long-term sentences or life imprisonment as an

alternative to capital punishment.1 When considering a sentence, the courts in common,
civil and international tribunal jurisdictions aim to fulfill the purpose of punishment that
is commonly accepted in their respective jurisdictions. In addition, the courts consider
the gravity of the crime, mitigating circumstances and aggravating factors to decide on an
appropriate punishment.
To justify the imposed sentence in common law jurisdictions, the courts most
frequently rely on the theories of deterrence, retribution and incapacitation. The civil law
courts consider the above three factors; however, a greater emphasis is placed on
rehabilitation of the criminal as the accepted purpose of punishment in civil law
jurisdictions than is the case in common law jurisdictions. In international tribunals, the
Trial Chambers rely on the purposes of punishment as identified in the statute under
which they were created.
In common law, civil law and international tribunal jurisdictions, the courts rely
heavily on the presence of aggravating factors to justify imprisonment for life.
Frequently, courts will take into consideration mitigating circumstances to change the
sentence from life imprisonment to confinement for a specified number of years. What
constitutes mitigating and aggravating factors varies in each jurisdiction but frequently
courts consider an admission of guilt by the accused, the age of the accused when the
crime was committed, his culpability, remorse and various other circumstances
surrounding the crime as mitigating factors. In an attempt not to lessen the stigma of a

1

Prepare a comparative study of sentences imposed for murder or mass murder in civil and common law
jurisdictions, particularly common law jurisdictions that do not impose the death penalty.

1

guilty verdict on those convicts who receive a shorter sentence, the international tribunal
courts make it very clear that the presence of mitigating factors do not lessen the severity
of the crime.

II.

Factual Background.

Although most common and civil law jurisdictions have abolished the death
penalty as a form of legal punishment for crimes, some have retained it. The United
Nations Secretary General issued the following statistics in 1999: “…ninety states retain
the death penalty, sixty-one have totally abolished it for all crimes, fourteen have
abolished it for ordinary crimes, and twenty-seven have abolished it de facto, for a total
of 102 abolitionist states.”2 In 2002, the number of states retaining the death penalty fell
to seventy-one, and the number of abolitionist states had risen to 123.3
Although the Russian criminal code permits the use of the death penalty, the
President has signed on to the Council of Europe’s Protocol 6, under which the Russian
Federation agreed to impose no longer the death penalty.4 Peru retains capital punishment
only in cases of treason, while China only sanctions it for any intentional murder or an

2

United States v. Burns, 95 A.J.I.L, 666, 670 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab
33].
3

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 33].

4

Russian Federation Law Digest in Martindale-Hubbell International Law DIGEST (2003). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at tab 38].

2

“especially serious act of corruption.”5 The United States is one of the most prominent
developed countries that maintains and implements the death penalty today. In the
United States, the death penalty is a matter of state law; many states no longer employ it.
Chapter 51 section 1111 of the United States Code defines murder as “the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought.”6 The United States law stipulates
that, for states that still use the death penalty, it should be the punishment imposed upon
any person who commits a first-degree murder.7 “Whoever is guilty of murder in the first
degree, shall suffer death unless the jury qualifies its verdict by adding thereto ‘without
capital punishment’, in which event he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.”8
Most countries do not retain the death penalty as a legal form of punishment.
Ecuador does not impose the death penalty,9 nor does Canada,10 Northern Ireland,11 or the
United Kingdom.12 Italy,13 South Africa14, and Namibia15 no longer employ the death

5

Peru Law Digest in Martindale-Hubbell International Law DIGEST (2003). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at tab 36]; People’s Republic of China Law Digest in Martindale-Hubbell
International Law DIGEST (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 37].
6

51 U.S.C. §1111(1994). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 8].

7

The United States Code Chapter 51 §1111 defines first degree murder as “[e]very murder perpetrated by
poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberated, malicious, and premeditated killing.” Id.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 8].
8

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 8].

9

Ecuador Law Digest in Martindale-Hubbell International Law DIGEST (2003). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at tab 35].
10

Kindler v. Canada, 1988, 6 W.C.B. (2d) 277, 58. (Hereinafter, Kindler). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at tab 10].

11

Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c.53, §1 (Eng.). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at tab 3].

12

Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c. 71 (Eng.). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 2].
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penalty. In 1976, Canada officially abolished the death penalty, although it had not
executed anyone since 1962.16 Canadian courts, instead, sentence both first and seconddegree murderers to life imprisonment.17 This sentence is a prescribed minimum.18
England abolished capital punishment in 1965.19 The statute abolishing the death penalty
also established the alternative punishment—life imprisonment.20 The statute reads: “(1)
No person shall suffer death for murder, and a person convicted of murder shall…be
sentenced to imprisonment for life.”21 The statute commutes sentences of all those
persons sentenced to death to sentences of life imprisonment.22
The statute concerning murder in Northern Ireland is very similar to that of
England. Chapter 53 of Northern Ireland’s 1973 Emergency Provisions Act reads: “1.
Punishment for murder. (1) No person shall suffer death for murder and a person

13

“Only two types of punishments are available as principal penalties: monetary sanctions or prison
sentences.” Elisabetta Grande, The rise and fall of the rehabilitative ideal in Italian Criminal Justice,
(2002) Global Juris Topics, at http://web7.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at 31].

14

2002 (6) BCLR 551 (SCA). (Hereinafter, Bull). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 24].

15

1996 (7) BCLR 966 (NmS) (Hereinafter, Tcoeib). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 23].

16

Kindler at 58. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

17

Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §235(1) (1985) (Can.). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
tab 1].

18

Id. at §235(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 1].

19

Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c. 71 (Eng.). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at tab 2].
20

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 2].

21

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 2].

22

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 2].
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convicted of murder shall…be sentenced to imprisonment for life.”23 The Irish provision
also commuted death sentence to life imprisonment.24 Under Chinese law—which still
allows for capital punishment—the alternative is incarceration for life.25 It is clearly
established in common and civil law jurisdictions – both those that maintain the death
penalty and those that do not – for crimes severe enough to warrant the death penalty, the
only alternative to capital punishment is a sentence of imprisonment, possibly for life.
The Statutes establishing the International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR) indicate that the most serious
punishment either is able to hand down is a sentence of life imprisonment.26 The statutes
of both the ICTY and ICTR state that the “Trial Chambers shall pronounce judgments
and impose sentences and penalties on persons convicted of serious violations of
international humanitarian law.”27 The relevant provision of the ICTR’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence is Rule 101:
A. A person convicted by the Tribunal may be sentenced
to imprisonment for a fixed term or the remainder of his
life.
B. In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall
take into account the factors mentioned in Article 23(2)
of the Statute, as well as such factors as:

23

Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, §1 (Eng.). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 3].

24

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 3].

25

WEI LUO, THE 1997 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH ENGLISH
TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION 45-46. (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. Buffalo, New York) (1998).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 28].
26

Statute of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, art. 24 (1993). (Hereinafter, ICTY Statute).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 7]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art.
23 (1994). (Hereinafter, ICTR Statute). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 6].

27

ICTY Statute at art. 23. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 7]; ICTR Statute at art. 22.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 6].
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i. any aggravating circumstances;
ii. any mitigating circumstances including
substantial co-operations with the
Prosecutor by the convicted person before
or after conviction;
iii. the general practice regarding prison
sentence in the court of Rwanda;
iv. the extent to which any penalty imposed
by a court of a any State on the convicted
persons for the same act has already been
served, as referred to in Article 9(3) of the
Statute.
C. The Trial Chamber shall indicate whether multiple
sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently.
D. Credit shall be given to the convicted person for the
period, if any, during which the convicted person was
detained in custody pending his surrender to the
Tribunal or pending trial or appeal.28
Rule 101 of the Yugoslavia Tribunal is almost identical to the rule for Rwanda.29
When considering sentences, both of the Trial Chambers were instructed to
consider a variety of circumstances in assessing the length of incarceration.30 In addition
to considering both the mitigating and aggravating factors unique to each case, the Trial
Chambers of both the ICTY and ICTR refer to the national criminal code and precedent
from other international tribunals, to hand down a personalized sentenced with the
intentions of fulfilling the purposes of punishment discussed below.31 At Nuremberg,
those persons who were found guilty of crimes against humanity and genocide were

28

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for Rwanda, 2002, §4, rule 101, www.itcr.org. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 4].

29

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for Yugoslavia, 1995, §4, rule 101,
www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev6.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 5].

30

ICTY Statute at art. 24. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 7]; ICTR Statute at art. 23.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 6].

31

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tabs 6 and 7].
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frequently put to death, unless the Court decided another punishment was just.32 Of the
twenty-two people tried at Nuremberg, sixteen were convicted of crimes against
humanity.33 Of those sixteen, four received prison terms, one for fifteen years, two for
twenty, and one for life, and twelve were sentenced to death by hanging.34 The Trial
Chamber of the ICTR has sentenced convicts for terms between twelve years and life
imprisonment.35 The ICTY has sentence people from five years in prison up to forty-six
years.36
There is a very unique feature in the International Tribunals—their consideration
of national level law. When the ICTY and ICTR consider a punishment for a murderer,
the Trial Chambers must consider the type of punishment the criminal would be subject
to in the national courts where the harm was committed.37 That is, the ICTY must
consider the law of the former Yugoslavia, and the ICTR must take in to account the law
of Rwanda. Furthermore, Trial Chambers of Rwanda and Yugoslavia must “take into
account the extent to which any penalty imposed by a national court on the same person

32

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment and Sentence, Oct. 2, 1998. www.ictr.org.
(Hereinafter, Akayesu). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 12]; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Judgment, Nov. 29, 1996 at Para 29. www.un.org/icty. (Hereinafter, Erdemovic I).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14].
33

Erdemovic I at Para. 29. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14].

34

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14].

35

Keller, Andrew N., Punishments for Violations of International Criminal Law: An Analysis of Sentencing
and the ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 56-57 (2001). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 32].
36

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 32].

37

ICTR Statute at art. 26. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 6]; ICTY Statute at art. 24.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 7]; see supra note 28 and 29.
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for the same act has already been served.”38 This is clearly not relevant in civil and
common law jurisdictions because they are not supra-national judicial bodies. The law
these courts rely on to convict and sentence someone is national law.
At the national level of both the Tribunals—that is, Yugoslavia’s national law for
the ICTY and Rwanda’s national law for the ICTR—the criminal codes call for severe
punishment for crimes against humanity or genocide (or the corresponding national level
crimes).39 In Rwanda, the Organic law is divided up into three categories.40 Category (a)
covers “persons whose criminal acts or those whose acts place them among planners,
organizers, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or of crimes against
humanity.”41 The mandatory punishment for persons falling in category (a) is the death
penalty.42 Category (b) includes “persons who acted in positions of authority at the
national, prefectural, communal, sector or cell, or in a political party, the army, religious
organization or militia and who perpetrated or fostered such crimes.”43 The punishment
for category (b) crimes is life imprisonment.44 In Yugoslavia, there is not a categorical

38

ICTR Statute at art. 9. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 6]; Similar phrasing in ICTY
Statute at art. 10. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 7].

39

Erdemovic I at Para. 34. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14]; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu,
Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, June 1, 2000 at Para. 28. www.ictr.org. (Hereinafter,
Ruggiu). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 17]; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR
97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, Sept. 4, 1998 at Para. 18. www.ictr.org. (Hereinafter, Kambanda).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 15].
40

Ruggiu at Para. 28. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 17].

41

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 17].

42

Id. at Para. 29. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 17]; Kambanda at Para 19.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 15].
43

Ruggiu at Para 28. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 17].

44

Id. at Para. 29. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 17]; Kambanda at Para. 19.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 15].
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system.45 Under Chapter XVI, Articles 141 through 156 of the former Yugoslavia’s
criminal code, genocide and crimes against humanity are punishable by a minimum of
five years and a maximum of 15 years in prison, or twenty years or death in cases of
aggravating circumstances.46 Unlike the national levels, the Statutes of the Tribunals do
not rank the penalties according to the gravity of the offenses.47 The Trial Chamber in
Kambanda concluded: “[i]n theory, the sentences are the same for each of the three
crimes, namely a maximum term of life imprisonment.”48
III.

Legal Analysis
a. A comparison of the purposes of punishment in common law, civil law
and international tribunal jurisdictions.
There are four widely accepted theories of punishment: retribution, deterrence,

incapacitation and rehabilitation.49 Most penal systems incorporate more than one of
these theories when establishing a sentence.50 First, the retributive theory “presupposes
that human actors are responsible moral agents who are capable of making choices for
good or evil. [I]t is right to punish one who offends against societal norms because it is
wrong to violate these norms. The offender ‘owes a debt to society’… [so] the offender

45

Erdemovic I at Para. 34. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14].

46

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14]; Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T,
Judgment, Aug. 2, 2001 at Para. 697. www.un.org/icty. (Hereinafter, Krystic). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at tab 16].

47

Kambanda at Para 12. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 15].

48

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 15].

49

RICHARD J. BONNIE, et al., CRIMINAL LAW 1-30, 1 (6th ed. 1997). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 25].

50

Id. at 2. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].
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must now atone by suffering punishment for the transgression.”51 Proponents of the
death penalty often cite retributivist theory as justification for taking someone’s life.52
Second, the theory of deterrence, both general (deterring society as a whole) and special
(deterring the individual), is purported to prevent people from committing crimes because
they wish to avoid the punishment that is the consequence of the illegal action.53 Third,
incapacitation serves to keep the criminal from committing more illegal acts by removing
him from society.54 Finally, under the theory of rehabilitation, “criminal conduct is
caused by the pathology of individual offenders.” 55 Rehabilitation is a form of
“humanitarian intervention that promises to cure offenders and return them to lawabiding ways.”56 Each of these theories has its advantages and disadvantages, which a
jurisdiction must weigh when adopting a theory of punishment on which to base its
sentences.57
In Kindler v. Canada, the dissenting opinion by Justice Hugessen summarized the
commonly accepted theories of punishment in the common law system and addressed
how the death penalty fits into the various categories.58 Hugessen outlined the test for a
legitimate punishment: “… is [it] necessary to achieve a valid purpose, …is [it] founded

51

Id. at 3. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].

52

Id. at 6. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].

53

Id. at 11. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].

54

Id. at 22. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].

55

Id. at 26-27. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].

56

Id. at 27. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].

57

Id. at 30. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].

58

Kindler at 70. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].
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on recognized sentencing principles, and [do] valid alternatives to the punishment
imposed [exist].”59 These tests are “…all guidelines which, without being determinative
in themselves, help to assess whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate.”60
Concerning the theory the death penalty serves, Justice Hugessen adopted the dissenting
opinion of Justice McIntyre in Regina v. Miller and Cockriell. Justice McIntyre stated
that a punishment lacks value if it does not serve as a deterrent or some other social
purpose.61 If the proposed punishment does not serve either of these purposes, it “‘would
surely be cruel and unusual.’”62 Justice McIntyre continued:
Capital punishment makes no pretence at reformation or
rehabilitation and its only purpose must then be deterrent or
retributive. While there can be no doubt of its effects on
the person who suffers the punishment, to have a social
purpose in the broader sense it would have to have a
deterrent effect on people generally and thus tend to reduce
the incident of violent crime.63
Justice Hugessen affirmed that the purpose of punishment is the “regulation of affairs in
the community and the protection of society from injury caused by those who break the
laws.”64
Justice Hugessen concluded that it is not reasonable for a society to seek to attain
more than those aims of punishment.65 He stated, “since capital punishment is the
59

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10]. (Referring to a list compiled by a Professor
Tarnopolsky.)

60

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10]. (Cited to Page 1074 of Professor
Tarnopolsky’s book that is not identified).

61

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10] (Citing Justice McIntyre’s dissenting opinion
in Regina v. Miller and Cockriell 63 D.L.R. (3d) 193.).

62

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

63

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

64

Id. at 72. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].
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extreme sanction, if it is to be applied it must be shown that its application is necessary in
the sense that the object of social protection could not otherwise be achieved.”66 He
maintains that the “punishment imposed for a crime should be in proportion to the
offense.”67 It must be “…limited to what is reasonably necessary to restrain the offense
and punish the offender.”68 When a state imposes the death penalty, it must first establish
a “compelling justification for using it instead of a less severe penalty.”69 He agrees with
Justice Lamer that the only theoretical purpose of punishment the death penalty serves is
the incapacitation of the offender.70 He argues though that this is a grossly
disproportionate punishment, similar to cutting a thief’s hand off, because there is a
legitimate and workable alternative, i.e., life imprisonment.71 Justice Hugessen is not
convinced that the death penalty serves as a deterrent, and therefore, deems it cruel and
unusual punishment.72
Because some of the states of the U.S.A. still employ the death penalty, it can be
concluded that those states maintain that it effectively serves their accepted theory of
punishment. However, there is as much variety of opinion on the effectiveness and
morality of the death penalty in the U.S. as there is in the international arena. In Trop v.

65

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

66

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

67

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

68

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

69

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

70

Id. at 73. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

71

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].

72

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 10].
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Dulles, the court stated, “[w]hatever the arguments may be against capital punishment,
both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purpose of punishment—and
they are forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history.”73 An
argument that the United States makes in defending its acceptance of the death penalty is
that the electorate deem it appropriate.74 At the fifty-fifth session of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, the European Union proposed a text that called for a
moratorium on executions and encouraged the complete abolition of the death penalty.75
The United States took exception to the proposed text stating that international law
allows for the death penalty in properly adjudicated cases and under appropriate
safeguards and that, “the decision whether to support the death penalty properly belonged
to the electorate.”76 In Kindler, the Canadian court seems to support the United States’
position. The Court stated “[o]ver the centuries the popular mind has turned away from
the worst forms of punishment… [w]e must consider all legal impositions of punishment
in relation to today’s condition and attitudes.”77 Although the ‘popular mind’ of Canada
has turned away from the death penalty, this assertion by the Canadian Court seems to
indicate that the decision of the legality and appropriateness of the death penalty rests
with the electorate. In United States v. Burns, the court affirms that “…Canada had itself
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abolished the death penalty and that the abolition of the death penalty has emerged as a
major Canadian initiative at the international level.”78
In civil law jurisdictions, the focus of punishment turns from retribution to
deterrence and rehabilitation.79 Criminal civil law developed in Europe from Roman
law80 over the centuries based on the ideas of the Enlightenment.81 The purpose of
punishment developed in this time was based on the views of scholars like Beccaria and
Bentham.82 The purpose of punishment was to “minimize general suffering by
preventing crime and to minimize the pain of criminals by imposing on them the smallest
penalties needed for prevention.”83
Under civil law systems, the main objective of punishment is deterrence and
incapacitation, but these systems also tend to consider rehabilitation as an important aim.
The Italian system of law has pursued the ideal of rehabilitation as the purpose for its
penal system since 1975.84 In fact, under Italian law, each person convicted is to receive
special assistance from either social workers, priests or other persons of similar regard
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and qualifications to help rehabilitate and re-socialize the offender.85 Recent Namibian
law exemplifies the emphasis on rehabilitation in civil law. In the Namibian
Constitution, article 6 states “[t]he right to life shall be respected and protected. No law
may prescribe death as a competent sentence. No court or tribunal shall have the power
to impose a sentence of death upon any person. No executions shall take place in
Namibia.”86 In Namibia, a life sentence, though normally indicating imprisonment for
the rest of the convicts natural life, has recently taken on a lesser severity due to the
Prisons Act 8 of 1959, which provides for a system of parole.87 Prison Service is
instructed to “‘apply such treatment to convicted prisoners as may lead to their
reformation and rehabilitation.’”88 The Namibian Court outlines what the values of
society require of the penal system. “[S]ociety should continuously and consistently care
for the condition of its prisoners and should seek to reform and rehabilitate those prisoner
during their incarceration and induce in them a consciousness of their dignity, a belief in
their worth and hope in their future.”89
In China, the penal system is viewed as a means of protecting
…the national security and the power of the people’s
democratic dictatorship and the socialist system; to protect
property-owned by the State and the property collectivelyowned by the laboring masses; to protect citizens’ privately

85

Id. Citing to the 1975 reform of Italian law, art. 1 and art. 13. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
31].

86

Tcoeib at 10. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 23]. Namibia is a mixed common law and
civil law jurisdiction, but the emphasis on rehabilitation is indicative of the civil law theories of punishment
that Namibia has adopted.

87

Id. at 3. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 23].

88

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 23].

89

Id. at 5. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 23].

15

owned property; to protect the citizens’ personal rights and
their democratic rights and other rights; to maintain social
and economic orders; and to safeguard the smooth progress
of the cause of the socialist construction.90
The punishment handed down in China must “…be equivalent to the criminal acts
committed by the offenders and the criminal responsibilities that the offender shall
bear.”91 This indicates that the Chinese penal system is concerned most with deterrence
and incapacitation because the law is intended to protect the citizens and ensure
economic and social order.
Under South African law, a mixed civil and common law jurisdiction, the courts
are enabled to declare someone a dangerous criminal if it is convinced that the person
“represents a danger to the physical or mental well-being of other persons and that the
community should be protected against him.”92 When the court declares a person a
“dangerous criminal” they shall be imprisoned for an indefinite period and be brought
before the court at a later date, set by the court, for re-evaluation.93 These procedures
were clearly put in place to prevent further commission of crimes under the theory of
incapacitation.94
In the South African case of Bull and Chavulla v. S, the defendants committed an
armed robbery of a bakery where they killed the owner’s son and a customer. The
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defendants were convicted on two counts of murder, one count of robbery, one count of
attempted robbery and one count each for illegal possession of a firearm. 95 The South
African court determined that the defendants were dangerous criminals and sentenced
them to imprisonment for an indefinite period.96 After appeal, the court sentenced the
defendants to incarceration for an indeterminate time to be reconsidered again in fifty
years.97 The court stated that “[i]n recent years the protection of the community and the
purpose of prevention of future offenses have received greater emphasis by our courts,
particularly in cases of violent crime.”98 The court expressed its concern about
recidivism and the need for the courts to protect society against it. “With the abolition of
the death penalty society needs the firm assurance that the unreformed recidivist
murderer or rapist will not be released from prison, however long the sentence served by
the prisoner may have been, if there is a reasonable possibility that the prisoner will
repeat the crime. Society need to be assured that in such cases the State will see to it that
such a recidivist will remain in prison permanently.”99
In Bull, the South African court stated “[s]ince the abolition of the death penalty
this Court has consistently recognized thsiluat (sic.) life imprisonment is the most severe
and onerous sentence which can be imposed and that it is the appropriate sentence to
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impose in those cases where the accused must effectively be removed from society.”100
The Court indicated that the one factor that saves life imprisonment from being cruel,
inhumane and degrading punishment is the possibility of parole.101
International tribunal jurisdictions rely less on the theory of rehabilitation than do
civil law jurisdictions. International tribunal jurisdictions rely on the theories of
punishment they were intended to serve based on the statutes creating them. The theories
used by the international tribunals are deterrence, retribution and incapacitation. The
preambles of both the statutes establishing the International Tribunals indicate the
purpose of the prosecution and the punishment of the criminals they prosecute. The
United Nations created the ICTY and ICTR because of the “grave concerns,” the
international body had about the “…reports indicating that genocide and other systemic,
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have been
committed…” in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.102 In
Kambanda, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR stated, “the aim for the establishment of the
Tribunal was to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the atrocities in Rwanda in such
as way as to put an end to impunity and thereby to promote national reconciliation and
the restoration of peace.”103 Both statutes pronounced that the prosecution of these people
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would “contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively
redressed.”104
The Trial Chamber in Ruggiu proclaimed that “[t]he jurisprudence of the ICTR
with regard to penalties has addressed the principal aims of sentencing, namely
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and justice.”105 These statements seem to indicate
that the purpose of punishment in the international arena is deterrence, incapacitation, and
retribution. Because the maximum punishment that either of the Tribunals can hand
down is life imprisonment, a conclusion can be drawn that the framers of the Tribunals’
statutes maintained that life imprisonment served the purposes of punishment that they
held most important. Although the statutes do not provide an outline of appropriate
punishments, the Trial Chambers are expected to hand down a sentence that they think is
suitable to the crime.106
When the ICTY and ICTR consider a punishment for a murderer the Trial
Chambers must consider the type of punishment the criminal would be subject to in the
national courts in which the harm was committed.107 At the national level, Yugoslav law
maintained rehabilitation, deterrence and incapacitation as its accepted theories of
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punishment. The Criminal Code of the Former Yugoslavia that was in effect at the time
the crimes were committed stated:
Within the general purpose of criminal sanctions (article
5(2)), the purpose of punishment is to:
(1) Prevent the perpetrator from committing criminal
offenses and re-socialise (sic.) him.
(2) Pedagogically influence others not to commit criminal
offenses;
(3) Strengthen the morals of the socialist self-managing
society and to influence the development of social
responsibility and of discipline amongst the citizens.108
Article 5(2) reads: “‘[t]he general purpose of prescribing and imposing criminal
sanctions is the repression of socially dangerous activities, which threaten or harm the
social values protected by the penal legislation.’”109
In the ICTY case, Erdemovic I, the Trial Chamber discussed at length the purpose
of punishment under the Statute of the ICTY. The Trial Chamber consented that the
ICTY Statute does not provide any indication as to what is an appropriate prison term for
criminals in its jurisdiction.110 The Trial Chamber stated that the criminal code of the
former Yugoslavia called for the most severe punishments for those people who commit
genocide or war crimes.111 The Chamber concluded that the use of the most severe
punishment for the gravest crimes is a “general principle of law common to all
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nations…”112 Thus, the commission of a crime against humanity is such a heinous act
that it deserves the most severe penalties when no mitigating circumstances exist.113
In considering the appropriate sentence length for a convict, the Trial Chamber
asserted that it must focus on the “very object and purpose” of the Tribunal, as seen by
the U.N. and its member states.114 The Trial Chamber declared that the U.N. conceived
of the International Tribunals as a means of deterring the commission of crimes and
atrocities.115 In addition, the Security Council Members “were marked by the idea of a
penalty as proportionate retribution and reprobation by the international community of
those convicted of serious violations of international humanitarian laws.”116 The Trial
Chamber continued, “[t]he International Tribunal’s objective as seen by the Security
Council – i.e. general prevention (or deterrence), reprobation, retribution (or “just
deserts”), as well as collective reconciliation – fit into the Security Council’s broader aim
of maintaining peace and security in the former Yugoslavia.”117
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The Trial Chamber stated that the only precedents in international law are from
the judgments at Nuremberg and Tokyo.118 The purpose of those sentences was general
deterrence and retribution.119 The rehabilitative purpose of punishment is ruled out by
the Trial Chamber because of the “particularities of the crimes falling within the
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal,”120 (although it consented that rehabilitation
might have been the aim of Article 27 of the ICTY Statute).121 Because of its review of
the precedents, both international and national, the Trial Chamber held that the most
important purpose of punishment is deterrence and retribution, and stigmatization of the
criminal conduct being punished.122 The Trial Chamber then accepted retribution (or,
“just deserts”), as an appropriate reason for sentencing, as long as the punishment is
proportional to the “gravity of the crime and the moral guilt of the convicted.”123
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b. The various jurisdictions consider mitigating circumstance,
aggravating factors, and the gravity of the offense when determining
an appropriate sentence.

To decide on an appropriate sentence for a person convicted of murder or mass
murder, each sentencing chamber in common law, civil law and international
jurisdictions considers the gravity of the crime, the mitigating circumstances surrounding
the crime and the aggravating factors. Each jurisdiction weighs each factor and decides
what an appropriate prison term would be. What a jurisdiction considers when assessing
the gravity of the crime, or what it considers to be mitigating circumstances and
aggravating factors does not vary much from common law, to civil law to international
jurisdictions.
In common law jurisdictions, courts determine a sentence for a person found
guilty of murder or mass murder, by looking to the combined weight of the gravity of the
offense, the mitigating circumstances and aggravating factors. The sentence should be
proportional to the crime, and serve the functions of the penal system most commonly
relied on in common law –deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation. Aggravating
factors are anything that justify a greater sentence, such as the circumstance of the
offense, the status of the victim, or the state of mind of the offender.124 When the judge
or jury weighs the factors, both mitigating and aggravating, it is a “consideration of how
credible, important, substantial, or persuasive the factors on each side are in their
totality.”125 In common law, judges and juries consider the gravity of the offense in
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assigning the charge of murder in the first or second-degree, where murder in the firstdegree is assumed graver because of the requirements of premeditation.126 For the
gravest offenses, where the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones, the penalty
is most often life imprisonment. Where the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating
factors and the gravity of the offense, the sentences cover a wide range of years.
In the United States case of Rhode Island v. Pacheco, Jr., the accused did not
actually participate in the murder, but it was committed at his prompting and under his
instruction.127 The accused’s friend (Tretton) killed the accused’s lover who was
pregnant with the accused’s baby.128 Pacheco prompted his friend to kill Pacheco’s lover
to hide his infidelity.129 The jury found Tretton guilty of first-degree murder and
conspiracy to commit murder, and sentenced him to life imprisonment, but made him
eligible for parole.130 The jury at Pacheco’s trial, however, found that there were several
aggravating factors, and sentenced him to life without parole.131
In Pacheco, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated that after a jury had “found
at least one aggravating circumstance [enumerated in the statute] the trial justice may
impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.”132 Tretton bludgeoned the
victim over the head with a window weight, stabbed and slit her throat multiple times, all
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while she was conscious.133 The jury found Pacheco guilty of aggravated battery and
torture.134 The trial judge defined the terms as follows, “aggravated battery is the
malicious causing of bodily harm to the victim before her death by seriously disfiguring
her body or a member thereof… [whereby]… [t]orture requires evidence of serious
physical or mental abuse of the victim while she remained alive and conscious.”135 In
addition to the charge of aggravated battery and torture, the jury found the aggravating
factor of murder for hire because Pacheco hired Tretton to kill the victim.136 The trial
judge, in rationalizing why Pacheco, who did not actually participate in the killing,
should receive a harsher sentence than Tretton, who actually committed the murder,
stated, “Pacheco was the one who conceived the plan to kill [the victim]. It was Pacheco,
not Tretton, who truly was motivated by some perverse, angry reason to have her
killed…Pacheco was the one who prompted and conscripted Tretton to kill [the victim]
with inducements of money, a job, and a car.”137 Finally, the trial judge affirmed that the
Pacheco’s sentence was proportional to the crime.138
Pacheco cited “his youth, his ‘mild history of trouble with the law’ and lack of
evidence ‘to imply that [he] had encouraged the torture or battery of the intended victim”
as mitigating circumstances.139 The trial court considered that Pacheco had the “benefit

133

Id. at 975. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 21].

134

Id. at 981. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 21].

135

Id. at 982. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 21].

136

Id. at 983. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 21].

137

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 21].

138

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 21].

139

Id. at 984. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 21].

25

of a caring, intact family throughout his life, but his behavior displayed an avoidance of
responsibility” in considering the aggravating and mitigating factors.140 The court found
that the mitigating factors did not outweigh the aggravating factors and gravity of the
crime.141 The court, therefore, deemed life imprisonment without parole, on top of a tenyear sentence for conspiracy to commit murder, an appropriate and proportional
sentence.142
In Kelly v. South Carolina, the jury at trial found the accused guilty of murder,
kidnapping, and armed robbery.143 He was sentenced to death.144 The trial judge told the
jury, in order to decide between death and life imprisonment, it should consider the
possible presence of “five statutory aggravating circumstances, and three possible
statutory mitigating circumstances,” (although the court did not list what these
circumstances are).145 The jury found that all five of the statutory aggravating factors
were present beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced Kelly to death.146 Similarly, in
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death due to
the presence of aggravating factors.147 The trial jury found that the defendant was guilty
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of aggravated murder because he committed the murder “while in the perpetration of a
felony.”148 The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the conviction and the
sentence of death. The Supreme Court reiterated the idea that the presence of aggravating
circumstance warrants a greater sentence because it increases the gravity of the crime.
The Supreme Court held on a prior occasion:
that aggravating circumstances that make a defendant
eligible for the death penalty ‘“operate as ‘the functional
equivalent’ of an element of a greater offense.”’ That is to
say, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial
guarantee, the underlying offense of ‘murder’ is a distinct,
lesser included offense of “murder plus one or more
aggravating circumstances’: (sic.) Whereas the former
exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment, the latter increases the maximum
permissible sentence to death.149
In the Irish case of R v Graham, the defendant was convicted of bludgeoning the
victim to death with a hockey stick.150 The judge sentenced him to life imprisonment.151
Upon deciding when the defendant would be eligible for parole, the court listed the
various aggravating and mitigating factors it should consider:152
14. Aggravating factors relating to the offence can include:
(a) the fact that the killing was planned;
(b) the use of a firearm;
(c) arming with weapons in advance;
(d) concealment of the body, destruction of the crime
scene and/or dismemberment of the body;
(e) particularly in domestic violence cases, the fact that
the murder was culmination of cruel and violent
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behaviour (sic.) by the offender over a period of
time.
15. Aggravating factors relating to the offender will
include the offender’s previous record and failures to
respond to previous sentences, to the extent that this is
relevant to culpability rather than to risk
16. Mitigating factors relating to the offence will include:
(a) an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, rather
than to kill;
(b) spontaneity and lack of pre-mediation.
17. Mitigating factors relating to the offender may include:
(a) the offender’s age;
(b) clear evidence of remorse or contrition;
(c) a timely plea of guilty.153

The guidelines for sentencing in Irish courts are based on the number of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances present.154 The lowest point is set at eight or nine years until
eligible for parole (when mitigating factors outweigh aggravating circumstances), the
middle point is 14 years, and the highest point is 17 or 18 years (when aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating factors).155 The court then stated that a defendant
should be denied parole longer if the killing was, among a list of things, contracted,
politically motivated, racially motivated, based on religion or sexual orientation of the
victim, as a means of gain, or one of many other murders.156 In the case before the court,
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the judge found that murder was committed without mercy, a savage attack and as a
means of gaining the affection of a woman.157 The court concluded that the victim was
subject to “gratuitous violence of the grossest degree.”158 The defendant did not fulfill
any of the mitigating factors that would warrant a reduced sentence.159 Therefore, the
judge decided the defendant should not be eligible for parole until he has served twenty
years of his life sentence.160
In another Irish case, R v Johnston¸ the two defendants were found guilty of
savagely attacking a man with a learning disability with at least three different knives
while he was sleeping and then lighting the room on fire to cover up the crime.161 The
judge sentenced Stephen Johnston, who was 25 years old at the time of the crime, to life
imprisonment with parole available only after having served twenty-one years of the
term.162 Paul, who was 17 years and ten months at the time he committed the murder,
was sentenced to indefinite detention, denied parole for at least nineteen years.163 The
reason for the discrepancy in years until eligibility for parole was that Paul was below the
age of eighteen, which courts frequently consider as a mitigating factor.164 The judge
stated, “every such case in which a life sentence is imposed requires to be considered
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carefully in the light of its own particular circumstances and in the knowledge of the
individual offender. There are gradations of murder as there are gradations of culpability
that may render one offence of murder more serious than another.”165 The judge
considered the following as aggravating factors: the murder was in cold blood; the victim
had learning difficulties, and the defendants inflicted “extensive and multiple injuries” on
the victim before killing him. Further aggravating factors of the crime were the sadistic
nature of the crime, the criminal history of the defendants, their lack of remorse, the use
of at least three knives in the murder, and finally the “attempted destruction of the scene
of the crime by fire.”166 In this case, there were no mitigating factors aside from Paul’s
age.167 The court stated that in considering the sentence the court must “satisfy the
requirements of retribution and deterrence having regard to the seriousness of the offense
in question.”168 The court concluded that the long prison term handed to each defendant
was proportional to the crime committed in relation to the aggravating factors present and
the absence of any factors that would mitigate the term.169 Thus it is clear, in common
law jurisdictions, the presence of an aggravating factor serves to increase the gravity of
the crime and, absent compelling mitigating factors, increases the sentence to mandatory
life, or in those states that have not abolished it, death.
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Civil courts function much the same as common law courts do in deciding upon a
sentence. The courts consider the gravity of the offense, the mitigating circumstances and
aggravating factors to decide upon a sentence that best fits the jurisdiction’s theory of
punishment and is proportionate to the crime committed. Under Chinese law punishment
is determined based “…on the facts, nature and circumstances of the crime, the degree of
harm done to society and the relevant provisions of this law.”170 The Chinese penal code
calls for consideration of mitigating circumstances that would serve to lessen the severity
of the imposed punishment. In the absence of mitigating circumstances as provided by
law, the court may lessen the punishment if the prescribed minimum would be too severe
for the crime.171 Similarly, Italian courts determine sentences by balancing the mitigating
and aggravating factors.172 Examples of aggravating factors are concerns about
recidivism and status as a multiple offender.173
In the Namibian case, S. v. Tcoeib, the accused intended to kill his employer’s
entire family because his employer accused him of stealing wine a few days prior to the
murders.174 He succeeded in killing two in cold blood.175 The jury convicted the
defendant on two counts of murder. The jury sentenced him to a term of life
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imprisonment for each count, to run concurrently.176 The court decided that the
defendant should not be eligible for parole for at least eighteen years from the date of
sentencing.177
There are no mandatory sentences under Namibian law that requires life
imprisonment for murder or any other offense.178 Life imprisonment, therefore, is “a
discretionary sentence…available for a court to impose should such court believe that the
particular circumstances of a particular case warrant the imposition of such a
sentence.”179 The Namibian court held that “[a] sentence of life imprisonment [is] a
punishment of extreme severity to be resorted to only in extreme cases.”180 A sentence of
life imprisonment does not deny a person of his/her life, but deprives them of the liberty
to enjoy it and “therefore [can] only be upheld if it were demonstrably justified.”181 As
mitigating factors, the defense offered the following: the young age of the defendant, the
fact that this was his first offense, that he lacked sophistication, that he was angry when
he committed the crimes, that he was a good worker; and finally, that he co-operated with
the police and prosecution upon his arrest.182 As an aggravating factor, the prosecutor
pointed to the fact that the accused carefully planned in cold blood the murder of
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“‘unsuspecting and helpless people.”183 The court decided that the “factors of deterrence,
prevention and retribution” required “more emphasis and weight [;]”184 and the
aggravating factors –that he is a “dangerous person who murdered for the flimsiest of
reasons”—outweighed the mitigating factors. 185
Similar to both common law and civil law courts, the chambers of the
international tribunals consider gravity of the offense, mitigating and aggravating factors
to decide the appropriate punishment for convicts in their jurisdictions. Although the
Trial Chamber of each should refer as much as practicable to the national laws, it also
will exercise its “unfettered discretion to determine sentence, taking into account the facts
of the case and the circumstances of the accused.”186 In Krstic, the Trial Chamber of the
ICTY enumerated the factors that should be considered when deciding what a proper
sentence is; it listed: general practice in sentencing in the former Yugoslavia, the gravity
of the crime committed, and the individual circumstances of the accused.187 Similarly,
the ICTR considered the following factors in Kambanda: general sentencing practice in
national courts of Rwanda, the gravity of the crime, the personal circumstances of the
convict, the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and substantial
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cooperation by the convict before or after conviction.188 In Krstic, the ICTY Trial
Chamber cited a prior case – Celebici – in which the court stated that the gravity of the
offense is “…by far the most important consideration which may be regarded as the
litmus test for the appropriate sentence.”189 The Trial Chamber in Krstic agreed and
stated that considering the gravity of the offense avoids “excessive disparities in
sentences imposed for the same type of conduct.”190
To assess the gravity of a crime the Trial Chambers must take into account
“quantitatively the number of victims and qualitatively the suffering inflicted on the
victims.”191 In Krstic, the Trial Chamber stated that it is the Trial Chamber’s duty to
determine based on the unique facts of each case, an appropriate punishment for the
individual.192 The Trial Chamber cautioned against establishing a set punishment for a
crime because of the varying factors that can mitigate the sentence.193 The severity of the
penalty must be in proportion to the gravity of the offense committed.194 The Trial
Chamber in Akayesu concurred with the assertion that the gravity of the offense is one of
the determinative factors in sentencing.195 The Chamber stated that it is “of the opinion
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that genocide constitutes the crime of crimes and is therefore crucial in determination of a
sentence.”196 The Trial Chamber in Rutaganda concluded that it is difficult to rank
genocide and crimes against humanity in terms of which is graver.197 Even though it
contended that establishing a rank is difficult, it agreed with the opinion in Akayesu, that
genocide is the ‘crime of crimes’. 198
The individual circumstances of the convict serve as either mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Each circumstance should be given consideration by the
Trial Chamber because they “bring to light the reasons for the accused’s criminal
conduct” and help the Trial Chamber assess “the possibility of rehabilitating the
accused.”199 For example, a high-ranking military or political official who abuses his
power would deserve a more severe punishment that a person acting on his own.200
Sentencing is a matter of “individualising (sic.) the penalty, in consideration of
the totality of the circumstances.”201 Mitigating circumstances are those “which are such
that they indicate that the objective of the sentence may be achieved equally well by a
reduced sentence.”202 For example, a guilty plea or cooperation with the Prosecutor203
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before or after conviction may cause the Trial Chamber to shorten the prison sentence.204
It is important to note that in neither the ICTY nor the ICTR does a reduction of penalty
diminish the gravity of the offense.205
In the ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Erdemovic was charged with
crimes against humanity and/or war crimes because of his involvement in the killing of
unarmed Muslim men.206 The indictment contended that the men were taken from their
homes by bus to a farm where they were taken in “…groups of ten and escorted…to a
field next to the farm building, where they were lined up with their backs to a firing
squad.”207 The men were then killed execution style.208 The accused plead guilty to the
charge of crime against humanity. Because of his guilty plea, the prosecution dropped
the war crimes charge.209 The sentence stated, “[t]he Trial Chamber considers that in
light of all the legal and factual elements which it has reviewed and accepted, it is
appropriate to sentence Drazen Erdemovic…to a prison sentence of 10 years with credit
given for previous periods spent in custody.210 Erdemovic appealed the sentence on the
grounds that his guilty plea was not informed, and that while duress does not “afford a
complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity and/or a war
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crime…it is admissible in mitigation.”211 Because of the new weight to the mitigating
factors, the accused was sentenced on March 5, 1998 to five years imprisonment with
credit for time spent in jail since March 28, 1996.212
In Erdemovic I, the accused plead guilty to crimes against humanity and the
Prosecutor dismissed the alternative charge of war crimes.213 To his guilty plea, the
accused added the following statement:
Your Honour (sic.), I had to do this. If I had refused, I
would have been killed together with the victims. When I
refused, they told me ‘If you’re sorry for them, stand up,
line up with them and we will kill you too.’ I am not sorry
for myself but for my family, my wife and son who then
had nine months, and I could not refuse because then they
would have killed me.214
The Trial Chamber said that the list of reasons that Erdemovic gave for committing these
atrocities might mitigate the penalty and depending on the ‘value and force’ of them,
might be used as a defense to the criminal conduct or perhaps even “eliminate the mens
rea of the offense and therefore the offence itself.”215 In cases of obedience to a
superior’s order, acting pursuant to those orders does not negate the criminal conduct of
the accused.216 However, the fact that he was acting under orders may serve to mitigate

211

Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgments, Mar. 5, 1998 at Para. 7.
www.un.org/icty. (Hereinafter Erdemovic II). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 13].

212

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 13].

213

Erdemovic I at Para. 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14].

214

Quoted in Erdemovic I at Para. 10. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14].

215

Id. at Para. 14. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14].

216

Id. at Para. 47. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 14].

37

the punishment.217 The Chamber commented that neither the Statute nor the Rules of
Evidence and Procedure of the ICTY require that all the factors enumerated therein be
considered in every case.218 For example, the Trial Chamber said that when crimes
against humanity are at issue, the existence of aggravating circumstances is irrelevant.219
In deciding on the sentence for Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber also considered the
fact that he surrendered voluntarily, “confessed, plead guilty, showed sincere and genuine
remorse or contrition and stated his willingness to supply evidence…against others
individuals.”220 Based on these factors, the Trial Chamber found Erdemovic guilty of
crimes against humanity and sentenced him to one prison sentence of ten years.221 In
Erdemovic II, the Trial Chamber took into account more factors as mitigating
circumstances.222 It considered his age, stating that he was young and ‘reformable’ and
deserved a second chance to set his life right.223 It also took account of his wife and
young son, who it said, would suffer if he served a long sentence.224 It also pointed to his
admission of guilt and remorse.225 Finally, the Trial Chamber said that he took no
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perverse pleasure from his acts.226 These factors, combined with a change in charge to
which he plead guilty (on appeal), resulted in a reduction of sentence to five years, with
credit for time served.227
In another ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, General Krstic was charged
with genocide, crimes against humanity, and murder.228 The Trial Chamber concluded
that Krstic participated in the ethnic cleansing of Muslim members of the Srebrenica
enclave and the killing of military age men in Srebrenica.229 The Trial Chamber found
the accused guilty of murder, cruel and inhumane treatment, terrorizing the civilian
population, persecutions and genocide.230 In considering the punishment the accused
should receive, the Trial Chamber stated, “[t]he commission of those crimes would have
justified the harshest of sentences in the former Yugoslavia.”231 General Krstic was
sentenced to forty-six years imprisonment with credit given for time served.232 This is
the harshest penalty the ICTY has handed down.233
In Krstic, the Trial Chamber listed factors that may and may not be considered a
mitigating circumstance.234 Factors that might be considered mitigating are assistance to

226

Id. at Para. 20. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 13].

227

Id. at Para. 23. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 13].

228

Krstic at Para. 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 16].

229

Id. at Para. 719. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 16].

230

Id. at Para. 727. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 16].

231

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 16].

232

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 16].

233

Keller, supra at 35, 36. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 32].

234

Krstic at Para. 714. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 16].

39

a crime instead of participation as principle of the crime and duress (though not as a
complete defense to the crime).235 In addition, personal circumstances of the accused
such as no prior convictions for violent crimes, significant mental handicap, an immature
and fragile personality, and a poor family background, might be considered mitigating “if
they illustrate the character and the capacity of the convicted person to be reintegrated in
society.”236 A factor that could not be considered mitigating is a personality disorder,
such as borderline narcissistic and anti-social characteristics.237 Krstic did not cooperate
with the Prosecutor or the Trial Chamber, which evidenced to the Trial Chamber that he
lacked remorse for his actions.238 The Chamber found that he was “a professional soldier
who willingly participated in the forcible transfer of all women, children and elderly from
Srebrenica.”239 Factors outlined as aggravating are such things as the level of criminal
participation, premeditation, and motivation of the convict.240 His rank in the VRS Corps
serves as an aggravating factor because he exploited his position to participate in
genocide.241 In General Krstic’s case, the Trial Chamber found that the aggravating
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circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.242 He was found guilty on all
counts and sentenced to forty-six years imprisonment.243
In a similar case, the ICTR charged Ruggiu with the crime of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide and of crimes against humanity.244

He pled not guilty at

first, but then applied for leave to change his plea to guilty.245 The accused was
convicted of both counts and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment for each count to
be served concurrently.246 The Trial Chamber considered the following as aggravating
factors: the inherent nature of genocide and crimes against humanity as aggravating
offenses, the crimes committed by accused fall under Category (a) of the Rwandan Penal
Code,247 the role of the accused as a radio broadcaster who incited hatred and violence,
and finally his awareness of the incitement caused by his words.248 The Trial Chamber
stated, “it is a good policy in criminal matters that some form of consideration be shown
towards those who have confessed their guilt…” because it encourages others to come
forward.249
The Trial Chamber considered the following as mitigating circumstances, the
guilty plea that shows his awareness of his guilt and the acknowledgement of his
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mistakes, cooperation with the Prosecutor and the absence of a criminal record. In
addition, the character of the accused (that he was strongly influenced by people who had
an advantage over him), and that he was a ‘person of good character imbued with ideals’
prior to his involvement in the crimes, are both considered mitigating circumstances.
Furthermore, his expression of regret and remorse, his profound sense of guilt and
responsibility, his assistance to the victims, his position at the radio station and in
political life, and finally, the fact that he did not personally participate in the killings
serve to mitigate his sentence.250 The Trial Chamber believed that the mitigating factors
outweighed the aggravating factors, and warranted some clemency.251 Therefore, the
Trial Chamber believing that “the accused has undergone a profound change and that
there are good reasons to expect his re-integration into society, sentenced him only to 12
years imprisonment.252
In Prosecutor v. Kambanda, the ICTR Trial Chamber found Kambanda guilty of
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit
genocide, complicity in genocide, and two counts of crimes against humanity.253 He was
committed to life imprisonment.254 Kambanda plead guilty to all six counts of the
indictment.255 At the time of the commission of the crimes, the accused was serving as
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Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Rwanda.256 He was head of the
government and had authority and control over it. 257 The defense listed three factors as
mitigating: his guilty plea, his remorse, and cooperation with the prosecutors.258 The
Chamber asserted that a guilty plea should serve as a major mitigating factor.259 It stated
“[i]n civil criminal law systems, a guilty plea may be favorably considered as a
mitigating factor, subject to the discretionary faculty of a judge. An admission of guilt
demonstrates honesty and it is important for the International Tribunal to encourage
people to come forth.”260 The Chamber considered the mitigating factors versus the
aggravating factors, that is, the gravity of the crimes committed knowingly and with
premeditation, and his position as leader of the government.261 The Chamber decided
that the aggravating factors negate the mitigating ones, and sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment.262
In Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber found Rutaganda guilty of
genocide, crimes against humanity, extermination; and crimes against humanity,
murder.263 The accused plead not guilty. 264 The Chamber concluded that he played an
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important leading role in these “indisputably, extremely serious” crimes.265 The defense
offered as mitigation the assistance Rutaganda gave to certain victims.266 However, the
Chamber decided that his high position in the Interahamwe at the time the crimes were
committed, and his knowing and conscious participation in them, and his lack of remorse
outweighed his assistance to a few victims.267 The Trial Chamber decided that the
mitigating factors were not enough to negate the aggravating factors.268 The Trial
Chamber sentenced him to one life sentence for all the counts.269
Similarly, in Akayesu, the Trial Chamber found the accused guilty of all counts of
the indictment and sentenced the accused to one term of life imprisonment because it
decided that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.270
The Trial chamber found the accused guilty of one count of genocide; four counts of
crimes against humanity, murder or extermination; and one count direct and public
incitement to commit genocide among many others.271 He was sentenced to life
imprisonment for genocide, extermination and direct and public incitement to commit
genocide.272 He was sentenced to 15 years for crimes against humanity, murder for each
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of the three counts of murder.273 The Trial Chamber decided that each sentence should
be served concurrently; he was therefore, sentenced to life imprisonment.274

IV.

Conclusion

As an alternative punishment to the death penalty for persons convicted of murder
or mass murder, common law, civil law and international tribunal jurisdictions impose
imprisonment. The length of the term is to serve the accepted theories of punishment
adopted by each respective jurisdiction and be proportionate to the crime. Proportionality
is determined by weighing and considering a variety of factors. Among these factors are
the gravity of the offense, the mitigating circumstances and the aggravating factors.
While some jurisdictions have explicit rules that the existence of any of a list of
aggravating factors necessarily invokes a harsher penalty absent any substantial
mitigating factors, others leave this determination up to the discretion of the judge or
jury. Most jurisdictions consider premeditation, pleasure from the act, and unprovoked
lethal action, among others, as aggravating factors. Similarly, most jurisdictions consider
a guilty plea, cooperation with the prosecutor, age, and remorse among factors that
mitigate. It is likely for convicts who committed aggravated murder with no mitigating
factors that the sentence will be very substantial. Conversely, the sentence for those
people who committed murder absent any aggravating factors and with factors that
mitigate, the sentence could be as short as five years imprisonment or the minimum
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required by law. Each jurisdiction weighs these factors and considers a punishment that
is proportional to the crime in view of these factors, and that fulfills the jurisdiction’s
theoretical approach to punishment as a legitimate and just punishment.
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